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U.S. LegaL ProFeSSIoN eFForTS To CoMbaT MoNeY LaUNderINg & TerrorIST FINaNCINg
 New York Law School’s April 2014 symposium entitled “Combating Threats to 
the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task Force” was the first 
law school symposium to address the impact of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) on the legal profession.1 For this reason, I was pleased to have been invited 
to participate and contribute this article discussing the efforts by the U.S. legal 
profession to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
 Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the FATF. Part II explains that 
money laundering and terrorist financing are federal crimes to which U.S. lawyers 
are subject. Part III addresses the U.S. legal profession’s efforts to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing by educating U.S. lawyers on how to avoid 
unwitting involvement. This section describes the educational efforts to date, 
explains why additional efforts are warranted, and offers suggestions for further steps 
that might be undertaken. The article concludes by noting that, while progress has 
been made, there is still work to be done to educate U.S. lawyers about how to avoid 
unwitting involvement in money laundering and terrorist financing schemes.
i. finanCiaL aCtiOn tasK fOrCE baCKgrOUnd
 Established in 1989, the FATF is an intergovernmental organization whose 
objectives include “combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related 
threats to the integrity of the international financial system.”2 Although the FATF is 
comprised of only thirty-four members and two regional associations, it has a number 
of affiliates that collectively generate a worldwide impact.3 The United States is a 
founding member of the FATF and considers the FATF to be a critical part of U.S. 
efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.4
1. New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial 
System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter New York Law School FATF 
Symposium], available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/fatf/.
2. Who We Are, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whoweare/ (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2015). When the FATF was established in 1989, its focus was on money laundering. See id. 
After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) expanded its mission to 
include combating terrorist financing. See History of the FATF, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
3. Members and Observers, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gaf i.org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). In addition to the thirty-six members, the FATF has 
eight “Associate Members,” including the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG); the 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF); the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on 
the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measure and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL); 
the Eurasian Group (EAG); the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG); the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD); 
the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA); and the 
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). Id. There are also a 
number of entities that are FATF Observers, such as The World Bank, the African Development Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, and the European Central Bank (ECB). Id.
4. See, e.g., Michael Rosen, Policy Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at New York Law School Law 
Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task 
Force Symposium (Apr. 25, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4F8TpKweET8 
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 One of the primary means by which the FATF seeks to accomplish these goals is 
by having its members agree to implement the FATF Recommendations.5 For many 
years, these Recommendations were known as the 40+9 Recommendations,6 but 
they were reformulated in February 2012 and are now known as either the FATF 
Forty Recommendations or the FATF Recommendations (“Recommendations”).7
(explaining the importance of the FATF to the United States); Press Release, United Nations Office on 
Drugs & Crime (Oct. 25, 2011) (estimating that criminals may have laundered US$1.6 trillion in 2009), 
available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2011/October/unodc-estimates-that-criminals-
may-have-laundered-usdollar-1.6-trillion-in-2009.html. The founding members of the FATF were the 
countries that comprised the G7 Summit in 1989: Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, along with the president of the European Commission. See History of the 
FATF, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2015); About the G8, U.S Dep’t State, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ecosum/2012g8/about/ (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2015) (“During the 1970s, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Japan, and Italy formed the Group of Six (G6) as an informal grouping of advanced industrialized economies 
that would meet annually to discuss matters of political and economic significance. Canada was added in 
1976 to form the Group of 7 (G7).”).
5. See infra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
6. See Fin. Action Task Force, FATF Forty Recommendations (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf; 
Fin. Action Task Force, IX Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 2001), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-%20
IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf. The original Forty Recommendations 
date from 1990 and were amended in 1996. Fin. Action Task Force, FATF Forty Recommendations 
2 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20
-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf. In 2001, soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 
FATF added eight Special Recommendations to address terrorist financing. Fin. Action Task Force, 
IX Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 88 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.
fatf-gaf i.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-%20IX%20Special%20
Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf. In 2003, the FATF amended the Forty Recommendations 
by, inter alia, adding the provisions to address gatekeepers other than financial institutions. In 2004, 
the FATF adopted a ninth Special Recommendation. See Fin. Action Task Force, The FATF 
Recommendations 7 (Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Recommendations], available at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf. Collectively 
these Recommendations were known as the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd, 
The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for Voluntary 
Good Practices Guidance for U.S. Lawyers, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 88 [hereinafter Shepherd RBA] 
(referring to the 40+9 Recommendations).
7. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6. The 2012 revisions consolidated, reorganized, and renumbered 
the existing Recommendations, which had been amended over a series of years. See id. at 4–5. As the 
introduction explains:
The revisions address new and emerging threats, clarify and strengthen many of the 
existing obligations, while maintaining the necessary stability and rigour in the 
Recommendations. The FATF Standards have also been revised to strengthen the 
requirements for higher risk situations, and to allow countries to take a more focused 
approach in areas where high risks remain or implementation could be enhanced.
 Id. at 8.
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 Although the Recommendations do not have the force of law,8 FATF members 
have agreed that the failure to implement them is grounds for expulsion from the 
organization.9 Despite the soft-law nature of the Recommendations, they are 
extremely influential because it is unlikely that countries such as the United States 
would want to be excluded from the FATF, which is a powerful tool in the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing.10
 FATF members evaluate their compliance with the Recommendations through a 
mutual evaluation process.11 The United States has undergone three Mutual 
Evaluations, the most recent in June 2006,12 and is scheduled to undergo the on-site 
visit for its Fourth Mutual Evaluation in early 2016, with the FATF Plenary 
Discussion tentatively scheduled for October 2016.13 In 2013, FATF members agreed 
that during the fourth round of mutual evaluations, efforts would be made to measure 
not just technical compliance with the Recommendations, but also the “effectiveness” 
of a country’s measures.14
8. See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. 
Prof. Law., 2010, at 6–7.
9. See Fin. Action Task Force, FATF Membership Policy (Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://www.
anti-moneylaundering.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=02AAE10F-F553-433A-8242-
FBDFF0AE969F. Step 2(c) states:
The overall mutual evaluation needs to be regarded as satisfactory, and in particular the 
level of compliance for the Recommendations dealing with the money laundering and 
terrorist financing offences (R.1 & SR.II), freezing and confiscation (R.3 & SR.III), 
customer due diligence (R.5), record-keeping (R.10), suspicious transaction reporting 
(R.13 & SR.IV), financial sector supervision (R.23), and international co-operation 
(R.35, R.36, R.40, SR.I & SR.V) need to be acceptable.
 Id.
10. See Rosen, supra note 4.
11. Mutual Evaluations, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (“The FATF conducts peer reviews of each member on an ongoing basis to 
assess levels of implementation of the FATF Recommendations, providing an in-depth description and 
analysis of each country’s system for preventing criminal abuse of the financial system.”).
12. See Fin. Action Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, United States of America (June 23, 2006) 
[hereinafter U.S. Third Mutual Evaluation], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf.
13. See Fin. Action Task Force, Global Assessments Calendar (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/assessments/Global-Assessment-Calendar.pdf (listing the 
schedule for assessments under the 2013 methodology in Annex 1). This date already has been changed 
once and is subject to further change.
14. Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations, Fin. Action Task Force, http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/documents/4th-round-procedures.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015) (“The scope of the evaluations will involve two inter-related components for technical compliance 
and effectiveness. The technical compliance component will assess whether the necessary laws, regulations 
or other required measures are in force and effect, and whether the supporting anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) institutional framework is in place. The effectiveness component 
will assess whether the AML/CFT systems are working, and the extent to which the country is achieving 
the defined set of outcomes.”); see also Center on Law & Globalization, Global Surveillance of 
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 The FATF’s efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing go 
beyond the Recommendations and the mutual evaluation process. The FATF also 
issues a number of advisory papers and other documents.15 For example, the FATF 
has published a number of different reports to help various kinds of entities use a 
risk-based approach (RBA) to assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.16 A risk-based assessment stands in contrast to a rigid rules-based “check-
off-the-box” approach;17 the rationale is that everyone benefits if a potential 
“gatekeeper” concentrates its resources on those clients and customers that pose the 
greatest risk.18 One of the most important documents from the legal profession’s 
Dirty Money: Assessing Assessments of Regimes to Control Money-Laundering and Combat 
the Financing of Terrorism (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_
Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20Money%201.30.2014.pdf (discussing assessment methods 
and offering recommendations). 
15. See generally Documents, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents.
jsp?lang=en (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (containing dropdown menus that allow one to select from many 
different types of documents). The document categories include Guidance, Meeting, News, Other, 
Public Consultation, Recommendations, Report, Risk Based Approach, Speech, and Statistics. See id.
16. See, e.g., Risk Based Approach, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/
riskbasedapproach/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (listing reports for the Banking Sector, Prepaid Cards, 
Mobile Payments and Internet-Based Payment Services, the Life Insurance Sector, Money Services 
Businesses, Legal Professionals, Casinos, Real Estate Agents, Accountants, Trust and Company Service 
Providers (TCSPs), Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, and Combating Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing–High Level Principles and Procedures). The FATF’s first risk-based guidance was 
produced for financial institutions. See Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper 
Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers, 43 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 607, 626 
& nn.108–10 (2009) [hereinafter Shepherd, Guardians]; Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 91; Fin. 
Action Task Force, FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: High Level Principles and Procedures (June 2007), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20
and%20Procedures.pdf (containing information directed towards financial institutions).
17. Under a “check-off-the-box” approach, those responding may view this as a required ministerial task that 
must be completed without thoughtfully becoming engaged with the underlying issues. See Shepard, 
Guardians, supra note 16, at 625 & n.106 (“The theoretical and practical underpinning of the risk-based 
approach is to ensure that limited resources to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are 
employed and allocated in the most efficient manner possible so that the greatest risks receive the highest 
attention. In this fashion, the risk-based approach differs fundamentally from a rules-based approach. 
Under a rules-based approach, a lawyer is required to comply with particular laws, rules, or regulations 
irrespective of the underlying quantum or degree of risk.”). Some commentators outside of the United 
States refer to this concept as “tick-off-the-box” rather than “check-off-the-box.”
18. See generally FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing—High Level Principles and Procedures, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
documents/riskbasedapproach/fatfguidanceontherisk-basedapproachtocombatingmoneylaunderingand 
terroristf inancing-highlevelprinciplesandprocedures.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). The term 
“gatekeepers” has been used to refer to the category of entities that were added to the FATF 
Recommendations in 2003. At that time, the Recommendations were expanded beyond financial 
institutions to include others that might serve as “access points” for money launderers or terrorist 
financing. As explained infra note 29 and accompanying text, the Recommendations refer to the covered 
entities as “designated non-financial businesses and professions” (DNFBPs), but they are colloquially 
known as “gatekeepers.”
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perspective is the 2008 FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals (“FATF 
RBA”),19 which sets forth a risk-based approach for the legal profession.20
 The FATF RBA is “high level guidance intended to provide a broad framework 
for implementing a risk-based approach for the legal profession.”21 It applies to lawyers 
who are engaged in one of five specified activities: “[1] buying and selling of real 
estate; [2] managing of client money, securities or other assets; [3] management of 
bank, savings or securities accounts; [4] organisation of contributions for the creation, 
operation or management of companies; and [5] creation, operation or management of 
legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.”22
 The FATF RBA has been the subject of controversy. For example, as Duncan 
Osborne’s symposium article and remarks reveal,23 the FATF has been criticized for 
the process used to develop the FATF RBA, including its unwillingness to engage 
meaningfully with private sector representatives.24
 A second controversy concerned whether the FATF would produce a separate 
RBA for the legal profession. Given the legal profession’s important role with respect 
to the administration of justice, the rule of law, traditional concepts of attorney-
client confidentiality, and the independence of the legal profession from governments, 
the legal profession thought it was important to have a risk-based report that 
addressed its situation rather than including it with casinos, precious metal dealers, 
and others.25 The FATF initially was reluctant to prepare separate reports, although 
19. See Fin. Action Task Force, RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals (Oct. 23, 2008) [hereinafter 
FATF RBA], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20
professions.pdf.
20. See Risk Based Approach, supra note 16; Terry, supra note 8, at 15–16 (“[I]n addition to the document for 
the legal profession, the FATF has produced guides on using a risk-based approach for the financial 
sector, real estate agents, accountants, dealers in precious metals and stones, casinos, services businesses, 
and the life insurance sector.”); Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 92 (“Guidance for each of the other 
[designated sectors] was published separately in 2008.”); Dialogue with the Private Sector, Fin. Action 
Task Force, http://www.fatf-gaf i.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/private-sector-
march-2014.html (Mar. 26, 2014) (“The FATF organised a meeting of the Private Sector Consultative 
Forum to discuss implementation of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/
CFT) measures set out in the FATF Recommendations, seek input and feedback into ongoing FATF 
work, and hear about issues of concern or interest to the private sector.”). The legal profession was the 
last of the DNFBPs for which a risk-based approach (RBA) report was produced. See id. Following the 
legal profession RBA, the FATF produced risk-based reports for sectors that were not DNFBPs. See 
Risk Based Approach, supra note 16.
21. See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 93.
22. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6, at 19–20 (Recommendation 22(d)). As Kevin Shepherd 
observes, no further definitions are provided. See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 93.
23. See, e.g., Duncan Osborne, The Financial Action Task Force and the Legal Profession, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 421 (2014–2015); Shepherd, Guardians, supra note 16, at 626–47.
24. See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 23, at 428, 431.
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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it ultimately agreed to issue separate documents for each sector.26 The FATF RBA 
was the resulting document for the legal profession.27
 The third controversy concerned how the FATF RBA would address suspicious 
transaction reporting (STR), which currently is found in Recommendation 23.28 To 
understand this issue, some background is necessary. Recommendation 22 applies to 
“designated non-financial businesses and professions” (DNFBPs), which is a FATF 
term of art that includes casinos, real estate agents, precious metal dealers, trust and 
company service providers, and “lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals 
and accountants.”29 Recommendation 22 states that when these DNFBPs engage in 
certain specified activities,30 they must comply with customer due diligence and record-
keeping requirements set out in other Recommendations.31 Recommendation 23 
supplements Recommendation 22 and sets forth STR requirements for the previously 
defined DNFBPs; it states that DNFBPs, which include lawyers, “should be required 
to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a 
financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d) of 
Recommendation 22.”32
 As one might imagine, legal profession representatives from around the world 
have objected to the implementation of this provision because it ignores principles of 
client confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, and raises concerns related to the 
administration of justice and rule of law.33 As a result of vigorous objections by legal 
26. See Shepherd, Guardians, supra note 16, at 629.
27. See id. at 629–30, 635–36.
28. Compare Fin. Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations 6 (Recommendation 16) (June 20, 
2003) [hereinafter 40+9 Recommendations], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202003.pdf, with 2012 Recommendations, supra 
note 6, at 20–21 (Recommendation 23). Because the FATF RBA was issued in 2008, before the 2012 
Recommendations were adopted, it refers to the older numbers. For internal consistency purposes, this 
article uses the current Recommendation numbers even though the FATF RBA uses the older numbers.
29. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6, at 20 (Recommendation 22 (d)). Similar to lawyers, the other 
DNFBPs identified in Recommendation 22 are only subject to the Recommendations when engaged in 
specified activities, which differ, however, for different DNFBPs. Id. at 19–20. In the 40+9 version of the 
Recommendations, what is currently Recommendation 22 was Recommendation 12. Compare 40+9 
Recommendations, supra note 28, at 5 (Recommendation 12), with 2012 Recommendations, supra 
note 6, at 19–20 (Recommendation 22).
30. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6, at 19–20 (identifying the five specified activities).
31. Recommendation 22(d) states that Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17 apply to lawyers who are 
engaged in the specified activities. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6, at 19–20 (Recommendation 
22).
32. Id. at 20 (Recommendation 23(a)).
33. See, e.g., Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 87 (“The [suspicious transaction reporting (STR)] requirement 
and the [no-tipping-off (NTO)] rule have been a controversial aspect of the application of the Forty 
Recommendations to the legal profession.”); Ronald J. MacDonald, Money Laundering Regulation—
What Can Be Learned from the Canadian Experience, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 144 n.2 (2010) (citing 
Canadian litigation and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) Money Laundering 
Committee web page and its contents).
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profession and government representatives, the Recommendations include an 
Interpretative Note to Recommendation 23, which states that lawyers and other legal 
professionals “are not required to report suspicious transactions if the relevant 
information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional 
secrecy or legal professional privilege.”34
 Controversy over the STR Recommendation surrounded the development of the 
FATF RBA, as well as the Recommendations. The legal profession’s representatives 
argued that lawyers had different attributes than the other types of DNFBPs, such 
as casinos or real estate dealers, and that lawyers should not be subject to either the 
STR or the “no-tipping-off ” rules.35 Although the FATF initially seemed reluctant 
34. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6, at 83. Because of the importance of this Interpretative Note, it 
is reprinted below, despite its length:
INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 23
(DNFBPS – OTHER MEASURES)
1.  Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as 
independent legal professionals, are not required to report suspicious transactions if 
the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to 
professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.
2.  It is for each country to determine the matters that would fall under legal 
professional privilege or professional secrecy. This would normally cover information 
lawyers, notaries or other independent legal professionals receive from or obtain 
through one of their clients: (a) in the course of ascertaining the legal position of 
their client, or (b) in performing their task of defending or representing that client 
in, or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration or mediation proceedings.
3.  Countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and 
accountants to send their STR to their appropriate self-regulatory organisations, 
provided that there are appropriate forms of cooperation between these organisations 
and the FIU.
4.  Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants 
acting as independent legal professionals seek to dissuade a client from engaging in 
illegal activity, this does not amount to tipping-off.
 Id.
 The 2012 Recommendations include the following explanation regarding the significance of Interpretive 
Notes:
The FATF Standards comprise the Recommendations themselves and their Interpretive 
Notes, together with the applicable definitions in the Glossary. The measures set out in 
the FATF Standards should be implemented by all members of the FATF and the 
FSRBs, and their implementation is assessed rigorously through Mutual Evaluation 
processes, and through the assessment processes of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank – on the basis of the FATF’s common assessment methodology. 
Some Interpretive Notes and definitions in the glossary include examples which 
illustrate how the requirements could be applied. These examples are not mandatory 
elements of the FATF Standards, and are included for guidance only. The examples are 
not intended to be comprehensive, and although they are considered to be helpful 
indicators, they may not be relevant in all circumstances.
 Id. at 8.
35. See Shepherd, Guardians, supra note 16, at 617–18. The “no-tipping-off ” rule prohibits a lawyer from 
advising a client that the lawyer has submitted a suspicious transaction report regarding that client. See 
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to discuss these issues,36 it ultimately agreed to omit these requirements from the 
FATF RBA for lawyers.37 It is worth noting that the FATF expected each country to 
develop its own approach to elaborate upon the high-level guidance provided in the 
FATF RBA.38
 As a final background point, it is important to note that with respect to the legal 
profession, the FATF’s Third Mutual Evaluation of the United States rated it 
“noncompliant” or “partially compliant” on several points.39 These noncompliant 
ratings involved, inter alia, the United States’ failure to have its lawyers subject to 
generally 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6, at 20 (Recommendation 23(a)) (incorporating the 
no-tipping-off requirements in Recommendation 21).
36. See Shepherd, Guardians, supra note 16, at 618.
37. Id. at 635–36 (“Importantly for lawyers, the Paris meeting led to a resolution, if not an uneasy truce, on 
the contentious STR issue. . . . After considerable debate, FATF and the lawyers resolved the issue by 
acknowledging that STRs are not part of risk assessment; rather, STRs represent a response mechanism 
once a suspicion of money laundering has been identified. Because of the risk-based approach orientation 
of Lawyer Guidance, FATF agreed to language that would not impose a mandatory STR obligation on 
legal professionals.” (footnotes omitted)).
38. See, e.g., FATF RBA, supra note 19, at 4–5.
6. The purpose of this Guidance is to:
	 •	 	Support	 the	 development	 of	 a	 common	understanding	 of	what	 the	 risk-based	
approach involves.
	 •	 	Outline	the	high-level	principles	involved	in	applying	the	risk-based	approach.
	 •	 	Indicate	 good	practice	 in	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 an	 effective	 risk-
based approach.
7.  However, it should be noted that applying a risk-based approach is not mandatory. 
A properly applied risk-based approach does not necessarily mean a reduced burden, 
although it should result in a more cost effective use of resources. For some 
countries, applying a rules-based system might be more appropriate. Countries will 
need to make their own determinations on whether to apply a risk-based approach, 
based on their specific money laundering/terrorist financing risks, size and nature 
of the DNFBP activities, and other relevant information. The issue of timing is also 
relevant for countries that may have applied anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist 
financing (AML/CFT) measures to DNFBPs, but where it is uncertain whether 
the DNFBPs have sufficient experience to implement and apply an effective risk-
based approach.
 Id. (footnotes omitted). Despite the FATF’s adoption of a risk-based approach and the FATF RBA, 
some countries have adopted more of a rules-based check-off-the-box approach. See generally John A. 
Terrill, II & Michael A. Breslow, The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing: Lessons from the English Approach, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 433 (2014–2015); MacDonald, 
supra note 33, at 150 (criticizing the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) for its rules-based 
approach). For additional information about the implementation of the Recommendations with respect 
to the legal professions in various countries, see generally Terry, supra note 8, and the International Bar 
Association’s (IBA) Anti-Money Laundering Forum web page, which is available at: http://www.anti-
moneylaundering.org.
39. See U.S. Third Mutual Evaluation, supra note 12, at 299–303.
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STR, no-tipping-off rules, and the customer due diligence provisions found in the 
FATF Recommendations.40
ii. MOnEY LaUndEring and tErrOrist finanCing arE U.s. CriMEs
 Money laundering and terrorist financing are serious problems.41 Even though 
law enforcement efforts have increased dramatically in the past ten to fifteen years,42 
40. Id. at 300–01. The following are excerpts related to lawyers from Table 1 in the United States’ Third 
Mutual Evaluation, where NC means noncompliant and PC means partially compliant:
Forty Recommendations Rating Summary of factors underlying rating
12. DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8-11 NC •	 Accountants, dealers in precious metals and stones, lawyers and 
real estate agents are not subject to customer identification and 
record keeping requirements that meet Recommendations 5 
and 10. 
•	 None of the DNFBP sectors is subject to obligations that relate 
to Recommendations 6, 8 or 11 (except for casinos in relation 
to R.11).
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21 NC •	 Casinos are the only DNFBP sector that is required to report 
suspicious transactions; however, there is a threshold on that 
obligation.
•	 Accountants, lawyers, real estate agents and TCSPs are not subject 
to the “tipping off ” provision or protected from liability when they 
choose to file a suspicious transaction report.
•	 Accountants, lawyers, real estate agents and TCSPs are not 
required to implement adequate internal controls (i.e. [sic] 
AML Programs).
•	 There are no specific obligations on accountants, lawyers, real estate 
agents or TCSPs to give special attention to the country advisories 
that [the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)] has 
issued and which urge enhanced scrutiny of financial transactions 
with countries that have deficient AML controls.
24. DNFBP–regulation, 
supervision and monitoring
PC •	 There is no regulatory oversight for AML/CFT compliance 
for accountants, lawyers, real estate agents or TCSPs.
 Id.
41. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 480–84 (2014); Lawton P. 
Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney Facilitation on Money 
Laundering Through Commercial Transactions, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 6 (2011) (“The International Monetary 
Fund (‘IMF’) estimates that money laundering in a single year accounts for ‘between two and five percent 
of global gross domestic product, [which] amounts to hundreds of billions, and possibly trillions, of dollars 
in criminal proceeds that are annually laundered through the banking system.’ The transactions used to 
launder the money would be legal, if the money were not derived from criminal activity. Therefore, the 
crime of money laundering is aimed at deterring the predicate crimes, as well as protecting the financial 
system from abuse.” (footnotes omitted)); James K. Jackson, The Financial Action Task Force: An 
Overview 8 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21904.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) 
(“The economic implications of money laundering and terrorist financing pose another set of issues that 
argue for gaining greater control over this type of activity. According to the IMF, money laundering 
accounts for between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion in economic activity annually.”); see also Fin. Crimes 
Enforcement Network, Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016 (2012), available at http://
www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/Strategic_Plan_2012-2016_508.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
42. The USA PATRIOT Act, which was adopted after the September 11, 2001 attacks, significantly increased 
the United States’ powers with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing. The 2009 Intelligence 
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problems remain due to new financing systems and the creativity of those who seek 
to evade law enforcement measures.43
 In the United States, several laws address money laundering. For example, the 
Money Laundering Control Act makes it illegal to knowingly “(i) conceal or disguise 
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under 
State or Federal law.”44 Lawyers are subject to these requirements45 and are also among 
those subject to Internal Revenue Code § 6050I(a), which requires individuals to report 
the receipt of more than $10,000 in cash.46 “Structuring” cash payments to avoid the 
$10,000 reporting requirement is also a crime; thus, one could not intentionally deposit 
$9,500 and $600 in order to avoid the IRS reporting requirements.47 Lawyers are 
among those who may be convicted for violating this provision.48
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) also increased U.S. powers. See, e.g., Terrill & Breslow, 
supra note 38, at 443–44 n.63 (regarding IRTPA); Am. Bar Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions 
About the Gatekeeper Initiative and the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance 1 [hereinafter 
ABA FAQ ], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/
gatekeeper_faq.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (“The United States is a major participant in the FATF 
proceedings, and in partial response to the FATF’s Recommendations, Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act (‘PATRIOT Act’), which amended and strengthened certain AML provisions of the 
United States Code that originated with the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (‘BSA’). The BSA and, later, certain 
provisions of the PATRIOT Act, were directed primarily at banks and other financial institutions.”).
43. See, e.g., Baradaran et al., supra note 41, at 489 (“Traffickers constantly employ the latest technologies to 
keep ‘one step ahead of law enforcement’ efforts.”); see also Saby Ghoshray & Houman Shadab, Remarks 
at New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial 
System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/
financial-action-task-force-program/.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2013); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 2007 National Money 
Laundering Strategy 94 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy], 
available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/nmls_2007.pdf (citing, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
982, 1956, 1957, and 1960).
45. See, e.g., Cummings & Stepnowsky, supra note 41, at 26 (noting an empirical study of money laundering 
cases in the Second Circuit, finding that “[o]f the ten cases [out of forty money laundering cases] with 
lawyer involvement, four of the cases involved lawyer self-directed frauds”). These four lawyers were 
defendants in the criminal cases. Id. at 27.
46. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6050I, 5331 (2012).
47. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3), (d)(l)–(2) (2013); see also 2007 National Money Laundering 
Strategy, supra note 44, at 94 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5316, 5317, 5324, and 5332 as statutes used to 
prosecute defendants). In 2012, a Nevada lawyer was convicted on three counts of structuring financial 
transactions in violation of these provisions. See United States v. Wommer, No. 2:10-cr-00596-GMN-
GWF-1, 2013 WL 7390622 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2013). On December 17, 2013, at the request of the state 
bar, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order of temporary suspension and referral to disciplinary board 
with respect to this lawyer. See Bar Counsel Report, Supreme Court of Nevada In re: Paul E. Wommer, Nev. 
Law., Feb. 2014, at 36, available at http://nvbar.org/articles/content/bar-counsel-report-february-2014.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 494 F. App’x 615 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1299 (2013) 
(convicting the lawyer, among other things, of structuring payments); see also United States v. Sinko, 
394 F. App’x 843 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the lawyer’s sentence for conspiracy to commit money 
laundering and aiding and abetting money laundering for structuring a purchase agreement in a way 
that avoided disclosure of cash payments).
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 The United States also has adopted, and aggressively enforces, a number of criminal 
laws to address the issue of terrorist financing.49 For example, it is illegal for anyone—
including lawyers—to engage in commercial or financial transactions with persons or 
entities on the government’s specially designated nationals list or the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list.50 A number of federal 
agencies investigate cases of suspected money laundering and terrorist financing, 
including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).51 Statistics in the 
National Money Laundering Strategy Report (a government document) indicate that 
there have been a significant number of investigations, arrests, indictments, convictions, 
fines, and restitutions obtained on the basis of the work of a variety of government 
entities.52 Moreover, the regulatory structure has generated significant private sector 
involvement. For example, in 2004, money service businesses filed 296,284 suspicious 
activity reports and the securities and futures industry filed 5,705 Reports.53
49. See generally 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 44, at 16–19.
50. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains a specially 
designated nationals list (SDN), which identifies individuals and entities with whom lawyers and others 
may not have commercial or financial transactions. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Self Regulatory Bodies 
Call for Information and Cases 11 (2012) [hereinafter ABA Response to FATF], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2012nov26_gatekeeperreg.
authcheckdam.pdf.
The United States government maintains and enforces an extensive array of legal 
restrictions in this regard, including various executive orders issued by the President of 
the United States and regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
Office of Foreign Assets Control pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 - 1705, that prohibit lawyers and others from engaging 
in commercial or financial transactions with such designated persons and entities. See 
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
 Id. at 11. This document was submitted to the FATF in connection with the preparation of the FATF 
Legal Profession Typologies Report. The SDN list is sometimes referred to colloquially as the “OFAC list,” 
even though OFAC maintains sanctions lists that are different from the SDN list. See Resource Center: 
Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), U.S. Dep’t Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Resource Center: Foreign Sanctions 
Evaders (FSE) List, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/
Pages/fse_list.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (identifying six OFAC lists, including the SDN list).
51. See, e.g., 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 44, at 1–11, 97–99 (identifying 
various responsibilities and goals).
52. Id. at 89–95.
53. See id. at 86. The FATF has defined money service businesses as follows:
According to the generally accepted definition, money service businesses (MSBs) are 
non-bank financial institutions that provide certain types of financial services. Although 
the precise scope of the activities that fall into category “money service” vary from country 
to country (for example, the requirements for MSBs may only apply if the value of 
individual transactions and/or its turnover exceeds a certain value limit. They may also 
only apply to businesses that carry out the specified activities on regular basis or as an 
organised business concern, etc.).
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 U.S. lawyers are among those who have been convicted of money laundering and 
terrorist financing.54 Some lawyers appear to have masterminded the money 
laundering schemes,55 while others appear to have been brought into these criminal 
schemes by their clients or other associates.56 Make no mistake, however, these 
lawyers are criminals and their convictions demonstrate that lawyers are subject to 
U.S. criminal law. The FATF’s Legal Professionals Typologies Report suggests that 
the United States has been more aggressive than many countries in prosecuting 
lawyers for money laundering and terrorist financing violations.57
 Fin. Action Task Force, Money Laundering Through Money Remittance and Currency 
Exchange Providers 77 (June 2010), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/ML%20
through%20Remittance%20and%20Currency%20Exchange%20Providers.pdf (citations omitted). For 
the U.S. definition, see 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff ) and Money Services Businesses, Fin. Crimes 
Enforcement Network, http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/definitions/msb.html 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
54. See, e.g., In re Blair, 40 A.3d 883 (D.C. 2012) (disbarring an attorney convicted of money laundering, 
witness tampering, and obstruction of justice because obstruction of justice and witness tampering 
constituted moral turpitude per se); In re Tezak, 898 A.2d 383 (D.C. 2006) (lawyer disbarred); In re 
Abbell, 814 A.2d 961 (D.C. 2003) (lawyer disbarred); United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 
2001) (affirming lawyer’s money laundering conviction); In re Lee, 755 A.2d 1034 (D.C. 2000) (lawyer 
disbarred); In re Toussaint, 753 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. 2014) (per curiam) (describing a lawyer’s voluntary 
surrender of law license due to his violation of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.15 as 
“tantamount to disbarment”); Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Stern, 830 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 2013) 
(suspending lawyer for two years as a result of his complicity in client’s bankruptcy fraud, which resulted 
in the lawyer’s criminal conviction of money laundering and sentence of one year, one day); see also 
Discipline: Cheryl B. Chadwick, Or. St. B. Bull., available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/
bulletin/07jun/discipline.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). Two recent cases from Nevada show the 
interrelationship of the criminal law and discipline. See Bar Counsel Report, Supreme Court of Nevada In 
re: Paul E. Wommer, Nev. Law. 36 (Feb. 2014), available at http://nvbar.org/articles/content/bar-
counsel-report-february-2014; Martha Neil, Lawyer Takes Plea in Money-Laundering Case Linked to 
Convicted Ex-client’s Ponzi Scheme, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 24, 2014) (describing the conviction of Nevada lawyer 
Christopher Reade and noting the then-upcoming May 2, 2014 sentencing), available at http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_takes_plea_in_money-laundering_case_linked_to_convicted_
ex-client/; Jeff German, Las Vegas Lawyer Pleads Guilty in Money Laundering Scheme, Las Vegas Rev. J. 
(Jan. 22, 2014) (“State Bar Counsel David Clark said he would file a petition asking the Nevada 
Supreme Court to temporarily suspend Reade’s license until the bar takes action.”), available at http://
www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas-lawyer-pleads-guilty-money-laundering-scheme; see also cases 
cited infra note 57.
55. See Cummings & Stepnowsky, supra note 41, at 26; In re Blair, 40 A.3d 883.
56. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 54.
57. See, e.g., Fin. Action Task Force, FATF Report: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 30 (2013) [hereinafter Typologies Report], available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20vulnerabilities%20
legal%20professionals.pdf (“Criminal prosecutions were started in sixteen countries, with Austria, 
Spain, Italy, and Poland joining the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaching 
double figures of prosecutions in the last five years.”); see also U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations: Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Keeping Foreign 
Corruption Out of the United States: Four Case Histories (2010), available at http://www.
hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-psi-staff-report-keeping-foreign-corruption-out-of-the-united-
states-four-case-histories (cited in the FATF Typologies Report).
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 In addition to criminal penalties, lawyers are subject to professional discipline 
and may lose their licenses if they counsel or assist a client to engage in criminal, 
fraudulent, or other conduct reflecting adversely on their fitness to practice law.58 In 
The U.S. cases cited in the FATF Typologies Report included twenty-nine U.S. criminal 
prosecution or discipline cases against lawyers. Typologies Report, supra, at 39–146. Because these 
cases were spread out over more than one-hundred pages, and because the report did not provide full 
citations for some of these cases, the U.S. cases found in the FATF Typologies Report are listed below, 
with the FATF report case number appearing in brackets following the citation: United States v. Jarrett, 
494 F. App’x 615 (7th Cir. 2012) [Case 5]; In re Blair, 40 A.3d 883 (D.C. 2012) [Case 123]; United States 
v. Sinko, 394 F. App’x 843 (3d Cir. 2010) [Case 61]; United States v. Monea, 376 F. App’x 531 (6th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 356 (2010) [Case 27]; United States v. Crawford, 281 F. App’x 444 (6th Cir. 
2008) [Case 118]; United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1280 
(2008) [Case 106]; United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1046 (2006) 
[Case 113]; United States v. Elso, 422 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2005) [Case 119]; United States v. Robertson, 
67 F. App’x 257 (6th Cir. 2003), subsequent appeal remanded by sub nom. United States v. Rorrer, 161 F. 
App’x 518 (6th Cir. 2005) [Case 60]; In re Abbell, 814 A.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [Case 45]; United 
States v. Oberhauser, 284 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002) [Case 112]; United 
States v. Nolan Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) [Case 105]; United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245 
(3d Cir. 1996) [Case 29]; United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998 
(1992) [Case 62]; United States v. George, 839 F. Supp. 2d. 430 (D. Mass. 2012) [Case 35]; United States 
v. Harmon, No. CR 08-00938JW, 2011 WL 7937876 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011), rev’d, 537 F. App’x 719 
(9th Cir. 2013) (reversing a district court order for a new trial, finding harmless error) [Case 57]; United 
States v. Abramoff, No. 06-cr-00001(ESH), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119614 (D.D.C. July 14, 2014) 
[Case 49]; United States v. Ferguson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2000) [Case 46]; United States v. 
Nesser, 939 F. Supp. 417 (W.D. Pa. 1996) [Case 73]; United States v. Foster, 868 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994) [Case 59]; United States v. One White Crystal Covered Bad Tour Glove, No. 11-cv-3528 
(C.D. Cal.) and United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft, No. 11-cv-1874 (D.D.C.), resolved by 
settlement, United States v. One Michael Jackson Signed Thriller Jacket, No. 2:13-cv-09169-GW-SS 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2014) [Case 32]; United States v. Delgado, No. 3:12-cr-02106-DB (W.D. Tex.), 
United States v. Delgado, No. 3:13-cr-00370-DB (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013), and United States v. 
FirstCaribbean Int’l Bank Account No. 10286872, No. EP 12-cv-0479 (W.D. Tex.) [Case 104]; United 
States v. Bristol, No. 10-cr-1239 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011) [Case 58]; Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Dixon, 373 S.W.3d 
444 (Ky. 2012) [Case 3]; In re Shepherd, 91 So. 3d 283 (La. 2012) [Case 117].
58. See, e.g., Typologies Report, supra note 57, at 30 (“[T]en countries provided advice about disciplinary 
action taken, however the number of disciplinary cases reported exceeded double figures only in the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.”). The discipline rules that apply in the 
United States are the state equivalents of American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(a), and 8.4. Under Model Rule 8.4, it is misconduct for a lawyer to, inter alia: 
“(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another 
to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act that ref lects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4 (2014). 
Violating Rule 8.4 subjects a lawyer to discipline, including possible license revocation. Id. at cmt. 1. 
Rule 1.2(d) provides: “A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed 
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine 
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.” Id. R. 1.2(d). Rule 1.16(a) provides in part: 
“Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has 
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in 
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law .  .  .  .” Id. R. 1.16(a). Rule 1.16(c) requires a 
lawyer to “comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating 
a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation 
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.” Id. R. 1.16(c) (2013). The exception in 
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the United States, lawyer discipline is handled in a proceeding that is separate from 
a criminal prosecution.59
 In sum, lawyers who are engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing, or 
who are intentionally assisting a client in such activities, are subject to both criminal 
and disciplinary sanctions.60
iii.  U.s. LEgaL prOfEssiOn EffOrts tO COMbat MOnEY LaUndEring and 
tErrOist finanCing
 A. Why the Focus Is on Lawyers Who Unwittingly Assist Money Laundering
 The U.S. legal profession supports the government’s efforts to fight money 
laundering and combat terrorist financing. Each gatekeeper resolution adopted by 
the ABA begins with a paragraph expressing the ABA’s commitment to support all 
reasonable and necessary efforts made by the U.S. government to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing.61 The reports accompanying the ABA resolutions 
have referenced the National Money Laundering Strategy Report, thus highlighting 
the seriousness of money laundering and terrorist financing issues.62
 While it is regrettable that any U.S. lawyer has been implicated in such schemes, 
whenever you have a group of individuals—even professionals—some of them may 
intentionally violate the law. If the vast network of federal criminal laws and 
enforcement mechanisms are insufficient to deter intentional criminal acts by 
Rule 1.16(c) will likely be inapplicable. See FATF RBA, supra note 19; see also John A. Terrill, II & 
Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Dimensions of Client Due Diligence, in Kevin L. Shepherd, The Gatekeeper 
Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence (forthcoming 2015).
59. See, e.g., Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Am. B. Ass’n, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_
disciplinary_enforcement.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
60. See supra notes 54, 58 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation & the Profession, Section of 
Real Prop., Probate & Trust Law, Criminal Justice Section, Section of Litig., Section of 
Int’l Law & Practice, Report to the House of Delegates (2003), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/recommendations03/104.authcheckdam.pdf 
(“RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the enactment of reasonable and balanced 
initiatives designed to detect and prevent domestic and international money laundering and terrorist 
financing.”); Am. Bar Ass’n, Adopted by the House of Delegates, Resolution 300 Opposing 
Federal Beneficial Ownership (2008) [hereinafter ABA Resolution 300], available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2008_am_300.authcheckdam.pdf 
(“RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports all reasonable and necessary efforts of the 
United States government and the international community to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing activity in the international financial system[.]”); Am. Bar Ass’n, Adopted by the House 
of Delegates, Resolution 116 Adopting the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for 
Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2010) 
[hereinafter ABA Resolution 116], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/116.authcheckdam.pdf (“RESOLVED, That the American Bar 
Association acknowledges and supports United States Government efforts to combat money laundering 
and terrorist financing[.]”).
62. See, e.g., ABA Resolution 116, supra note 61, at 2; ABA Resolution 300, supra note 61, at 4.
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lawyers, it is unlikely that any additional efforts by the profession would deter such 
conduct.63 Accordingly, the legal profession can have the greatest impact if it helps 
lawyers avoid unwittingly assisting clients who are engaged in money laundering or 
terrorist financing.64
 The legal profession has determined that the most effective way it can educate 
lawyers to avoid unwitting involvement is by helping them understand the ways in 
which sophisticated criminals might use them to facilitate their crimes. While most 
(if not all) lawyers know the black-letter rule that they may not assist or counsel a 
client regarding criminal activities, many lawyers may not yet recognize the types of 
fact patterns that suggests these crimes are underway. In other words, lawyers know 
the “rule,” but they need to learn more about these kinds of “application” issues.65 
 As part of their educational efforts, U.S. legal organizations have strongly 
encouraged U.S. lawyers to employ the FATF-approved risk-based approach—
particularly during the client intake stage. The U.S. approach encourages the 
profession to do more than mechanically “check off a box” or apply a set of formal 
requirements (or have a staff assistant do so). It seeks to change the culture in order 
to make lawyers as sensitive to these issues as they are to conflicts of interest. The 
focus of a risk-based approach is to have lawyers thoughtfully evaluate the 
63. See supra notes 54, 57, 58 and accompanying text.
64. See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 98 n.54 (“The endorsement by the ABA of the Good Practices 
Guidance responds to requests by FATF, Congress, and federal regulators for guidance to the legal 
profession” that uses a risk-based approach). On the other hand, the legal profession has frequently 
pointed out to the FATF that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that lawyers’ unwitting 
involvement in money laundering or terrorist financing is a widespread problem. See, e.g., Council of 
Bars & Law Societies of Eur., Response to the Commission: The Review of the Third Anti-
Money Laundering Directive 6, § 3.2 (2010), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_ 
upload/NTCdocument/EN_211011_CCBE_Respo1_1319525363.pdf.
Although there has been no empirical evidence suggesting widespread unwitting involvement by 
lawyers, it certainly remains a possibility. While the legal profession is committed to doing its part 
concerning these criminal activities, it has called for an appropriate balance on the part of the FATF 
and its members when implementing the Recommendations for the legal profession. As recognized in 
the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of the Lawyer and in other documents, the legal 
profession plays a unique role with respect to the rule of law and administration of justice. Implementation 
efforts that undermine lawyer independence and attorney-client confidentiality and privilege need to be 
carefully considered so they do not have a deleterious effect on the administration of justice, particularly 
when there has been no empirical evidence of widespread unwitting involvement of lawyers in money 
laundering and terrorism financing schemes. See generally id. The importance of these issues was 
recognized in a British Columbia decision in which the Province’s highest court affirmed the lower 
court decision that the government’s money laundering regime was invalid, reasoning that the 
independence of the bar was a principle of fundamental justice with which the Regime interfered to an 
unacceptable degree. See generally Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can. v. Canada, 2013 BCCA 147. The result 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, although the reasoning differed. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of 
Can. v. Canada, 2015 S.C.C. 7.
65. As is described in greater detail infra notes 112–16 and accompanying text, the legal profession had urged 
the FATF to focus on unwitting lawyer involvement in its Typologies Report. The report, however, 
focused on existing case studies and thus on intentional wrongdoing. As a result, the ABA, CCBE, and 
IBA commissioned their own Typologies Report that focused on unwitting involvement, rather than 
intentional wrongdoing. See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
503
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
circumstances of the representation in order to make an informed decision about 
whether to proceed.66 The following section identifies some of the educational efforts 
that have been undertaken to help lawyers understand these application issues and to 
foster this cultural change.
 B.  Efforts Undertaken to Educate U.S. Lawyers About How They Might Unwittingly 
Facilitate Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing
 A number of legal organizations have been heavily involved in the efforts to educate 
U.S. lawyers about money laundering and terrorist financing.67 The deployed efforts 
include the development of policy statements,68 continuing legal education (CLE) 
sessions,69 articles,70 casebook discussions,71 and state bar web page articles or links.72
66. See, e.g., Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 94; see also MacDonald, supra note 33, at 150 (criticizing the 
FLSC rule for abandoning a risk-based approach and suggesting that a different direction was warranted).
67. The organizations that have been most active include the ABA, many of its sections, and its Task Force 
on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession; The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel 
(ACTEC), which co-sponsored the New York Law School FATF symposium; the American College of 
Real Estate Lawyers; the American College of Mortgage Attorneys; and the American College of 
Commercial Finance Lawyers. There are a handful of individuals within these organizations who 
deserve to be recognized for the countless pro bono hours they have devoted to educating U.S. lawyers 
regarding these issues. Several of these individuals spoke at the New York Law School symposium, 
including Kevin Shepherd, Duncan Osborne, and John Terrill. See generally New York Law School 
FATF Symposium, supra note 1.
68. See supra note 61 (citing ABA Resolutions 104, 116, and 300).
69. See infra notes 74–77 (citing, respectively, continuing legal education (CLE) sessions directed towards 
real estate lawyers, trusts and estates lawyers, and lawyers who form corporations).
70. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 8, 23 (citing law review articles); infra note 83 (citing articles that appeared in the 
ABA Journal).
71. See infra notes 79, 80, 127 and accompanying text (regarding the efforts to include this information in 
law school casebooks and in education materials for lawyer regulators).
72. See, e.g., Ala. State Bar, The Gatekeeper Initiative−One Form of Assistance to Legal 
Profession: Addendum 5 (June 2013), https://www.alabar.org/assets/uploads/2014/09/june-2013_
addendum_rev4.pdf; Good Practices Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, St. B. Arizona, 
http://www.azbar.org/lawyerregulation/rulesandotherresources/goodpracticespreventmoneylaundering 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Andrew Tuft & Rachel Chapman, Beware of Helping Finance Terrorists, Cal. 
St. B.J. (Apr. 10, 2011), available at http://apps.calbar.ca.gov/mcleselfstudy/mcle_home.aspx?testID=55; 
Paula Frederick, Money for Nothing, 18 Ga. B.J. 50 (Aug. 2012); Legal Links: Gatekeeper, Md. St. B. Ass’n, 
http://www.msba.org/resources/legallinks.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Money Laundering & Terrorist 
Financing, Minn. Bench & B., http://mnbenchbar.com/2012/12/money-laundering/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015); Voluntary Good Practices to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Mo. B., http://www.
mobar.org/practice-resources/voluntary-good-practices-to-combat-money-laundering-and-terrorist-
financing.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to Combat Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing, St. B. Nevada, http://www.nvbar.org/content/voluntary-good-practices-
guidance-combat-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Task Force on 
Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, St. B. New Mexico, http://www.nmbar.org/AboutSBNM/
gatekeeper.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to Combat Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing, St. B. Ass’n North Dakota, https://sband.org/News/NewsDetail.
aspx?NewsId=643 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Notice on the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the 
Profession, 2013, Pa. B. Ass’n, http://www.pabar.org/public/sections/rlpropco/gatekeeper.asp (last visited 
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 Many of the educational efforts have targeted lawyers engaged in the five specified 
activities listed in Recommendation 22.73 For example, efforts have been made to reach 
lawyers who handle real estate matters,74 trusts and estates,75 international practice,76 
Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing, S.C. B., http://www.scbar.org/News/NewsDetails/ArticleId/1575/Voluntary-Good-
Practices-Guidance-to-Combat-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorist-Financing.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, St. B. 
South Dakota, http://www.sdbar.org/new/members/gatekeeper.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); 
Voluntary Good Practices to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, St. B. Texas, http://www.
texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Resource_Guides&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.
cfm&ContentID=18944 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Va. St. B., http://www.vsb.org/site/news/item/voluntary-good-
practices-ABA-2012 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
In addition to these web pages, members of the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force have previously 
noted web pages for the District of Columbia, Connecticut, Florida, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming, however the links have either been changed or eliminated.
73. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 6, at 19–20 (identifying the five specified activities); see also 
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
74. Examples of articles include Shepherd, Guardians, supra note 16 (article published in the Real Property, 
Trust and Estate Law Journal), and Kevin L. Shepherd, Ethically Speaking . . . Just What Are My Obligations 
Under the Gatekeeper Initiative?, 27 Prob. & Prop. Mag., Sept.-Oct. 2013, at 43, available at http://
w w w.amer icanbar.org/publ icat ions/probate_proper t y_magazine_ 2012/2013/september_
october_2013/2013_aba_rpte_pp_v27_5_article_shephert_gatekeeper_initiative.html. Examples of 
CLE sessions include: Pa. Bar Inst., The Gatekeeper Initiative: Are You Unwittingly Helping Your 
Clients Launder Money?, 17th Annual Real Estate Conference (Dec. 6, 2013); Am. Coll. of Mortg. 
Attorneys, Risky Business: Are You Unwittingly Helping Your Clients Launder Money? (Sept. 27, 
2013); see also ABA Response to FATF, supra note 50, at 21–32 (Exhibit A cites educational efforts).
75. See, e.g., FATF and Circular 230: The Expanding Impact of Federal Initiatives on Legal Ethics, 
ACTEC 2012 Annual Meeting (March 7–8, 2013); The Financial Action Task Force and the Good 
Practices Guidance: The Impact on Trust and Estate Lawyers, Cal. B. Ass’n ( Jan. 19, 2013); 
International Planning Update/FATF & the Global Forum, 47th Annual Heckerling Inst. on Estate 
Planning (Jan. 12–16, 2013); The Financial Action Task Force and the Good Practices Guidance, 10th 
Annual Sophisticated Trusts & Estates Law Inst. (Nov. 8–9, 2012); FATF Tutorial Workshop, ACTEC 
Fall Meeting (Oct. 19–20, 2012); Ethics in Offshore Planning, Am. Law Inst.: Int’l Trust & Estate 
Planning (Aug. 23–24, 2012); Wealth Planning for High Net-Worth Individuals and Owners of 
Closely-Held Companies, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Continuing & Prof ’l Studies, Summer Inst. in Tax’n (July 
25–26, 2012); Guidance on Good Practices to Combat Money Laundering, Soc’y of Trust & Estate 
Practitioners (STEP) (Mar. 11, 2011); see also ABA Response to FATF, supra note 50, at 21–32 
(Exhibit A cites educational efforts).
76. See, e.g., Mikhail Reider-Gordon & Truman Kirkland Butler, Anti-Money Laundering, 46 Int’l Law. 
375 (2012); The New FATF Recommendations and the AML/CTF Methodology, Am. Bar Ass’n 
Section of Int’l Law Int’l Anti-Money Laundering Comm. (May 6, 2014) (A non-CLE teleconference 
and in-person program); Int’ l Anti-Money Laundering Comm., Am. B. Ass’n, http://apps.americanbar.
org/dch/committee.cfm?com=IC700500 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (including many useful links). U.S. 
lawyers and academics have also been very active in the IBA’s efforts to educate lawyers about money 
laundering. For example, Professor Clark Cunningham has spoken on this topic at IBA Conferences, 
assembled materials, and even prepared a video for the IBA. See IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum 
Website Updates Dec 2011, Int’l B. Ass’n, http://www.ibanet.org/ENews_Archive/
IBA_12December_2011_AntiMoney_Laundering_Forum_website_updates.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015). Professor Cunningham is the executive director of Georgia State’s National Institute for 
Teaching Ethics & Professionalism (NIFTEP) and is the creator of the International Forum on 
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and corporate formation and management.77 There also have been concerted efforts to 
educate ethics experts, such as general counsel in law firms78 and legal ethics 
academics,79 since they provide advice regarding risk management and rule compliance. 
The goal is to have a “cradle-to-grave” approach to education that begins in law school80 
and concludes by educating the regulators responsible for disciplining lawyers.81 State 
supreme court chief justices have also been included in the educational efforts,82 and 
additional audiences have been reached by publishing articles in the ABA Journal sent 
to all ABA members.83
 When educating the constituencies listed above, one of the primary tools is the 
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (“Guidance”), which took more than a year to 
Teaching Legal Ethics and Professionalism. For a wealth of additional information, see Anti-Money 
Laundering Forum, Int’l B. Ass’n, http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015), 
and Terry, supra note 8, at 20–27 (summarizing the data found in the IBA’s 2010 Global Chart).
77. See, e.g., Tuft & Chapman, supra note 72 (online CLE session); An Update on the FATF Guidance for 
Legal Professionals and Development of Good Practice Guidelines, Com. Newsl. (Am. Bar Ass’n Sec. of 
Bus. Law, Jan. 2009, at 39, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL190000pub/
newsletter/200901/all.pdf; Message from the Chair, Linda Hayman, Am. B. Ass’n Sec. Bus. L., Apr. 
2007, 1–2, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0058/materials/print.pdf; see also ABA 
Response to FATF, supra note 50, at 21–32 (Exhibit A cites educational efforts).
78. See, e.g., Hot to Pot: Money Laundering, Formal Opinion 463, and Legal Marijuana, Am. B. Ass’n, http://
www.americanbar.org/content/aba/calendar/2014/05/40th-aba-national-conference-on-professional-
responsibility/conferencematerials/session5.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Am. Bar Ass’n, Formal 
Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing (2013) 
[hereinafter Formal Opinion 463], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_463.authcheckdam.pdf.
79. See, e.g., 2010 FATF Symposium, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 1, available at http://www.anti-moneylaundering.
org/2010_FATF_Symposium.aspx (This symposium is discussed infra note 126). The International 
Forum on Teaching Legal Ethics and Professionalism has collected resources on money laundering from 
legal academics from around the world, including materials from the 2012 money laundering session held 
in Banff at the conference immediately preceding the International Legal Ethics Conference VI. See, e.g., 
Money Laundering, Int’l Forum on Teaching Legal Ethics & Professionalism, http://www.
teachinglegalethics.org/category/teaching-topics/money-laundering (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
80. The author has personal knowledge of the fact that U.S. Department of the Treasury officials have met 
with several different chairs of the Association of American Law Schools’ (AALS) Section on 
Professional Responsibility, including Professors Jack Sahl and Peter Margulies. The chairs have also 
met with representatives of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession. One of 
the goals of these meetings has been to encourage legal ethics academics to include more of this material 
in their classes and casebooks.
81. See Nat’l Org. of Bar Counsel, Program of the Midyear Meeting in New Orleans (Feb. 1–4, 2012) 
(including a Plenary session entitled “Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing”).
82. See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 98 n.55 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Michael A. Lindenberger, Into the Breach: Voluntary Compliance on Money Laundering Gets a 
Boost from the ABA and Treasury, 97 A.B.A. J. 56 (Oct. 2011); David L. Hudson, Jr., ABA Endorses 
Guidance for Lawyers on Fighting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 99 A.B.A. J. 64 (Sept. 
2013); ABA FAQ , supra note 42.
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develop84 and has been formally endorsed by a number of U.S. legal organizations, 
including the ABA itself and the Conference of Chief Justices.85
 As noted earlier, the FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals invited 
countries to develop guidance for their lawyers.86 The Guidance represents the U.S. 
legal profession’s response and provides more detailed information than is found in 
the FATF RBA.87
 Similar to the FATF RBA, the Guidance recommends that, during the client 
intake process, a lawyer consider questions about the nature of the client, the 
countries involved, and the type of service a client requests.88 The degree of due 
diligence that a lawyer performs should be determined by these client, geography, 
and service risk-factors.89
84. See, e.g., Shepherd, Guardians, supra note 16, at 662–63 nn.307–11 and accompanying text; see also ABA 
Resolution 300, supra note 61 (2008 ABA Resolution calling for the development of the Guidance); 
ABA Resolution 116, supra note 61 (August 2010 endorsement of the Guidance); Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2010) [hereinafter Good Practices Guidance], available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/voluntary_good_
practices_guidance.authcheckdam.pdf. It should be noted that the development of the Guidance and 
the other efforts have not been entirely altruistic and directed towards stopping money laundering and 
terrorist financing. They were also undertaken in the hope that steps such as this would make federal 
legislation unnecessary. See, e.g., Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 97.
85. The Guidance was formally endorsed or approved by all of the entities whose representatives participated 
in its development, the ABA Section of Law Practice Management, and the ABA itself. See Good 
Practices Guidance, supra note 84, at 1; ABA Resolution 116, supra note 61, at 3. For information 
about the Conference of Chief Justices’ endorsement, see infra note 98.
86. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Good Practices Guidance, supra note 84; see also Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 96 
(“[The FATF RBA] offers little practical guidance to U.S. lawyers.”). The Guidance includes Practice 
Pointers and a Client Intake Appendix. The Client Intake Appendix can be found on The American 
College of Trust and Estate Counsel’s web site, which is available at: http://www.actec.org/public/
Governmental_Relations/Voluntary_Good_Practices.asp. The Appendix to this article provides a 
summary of the ABA Guidance and cites the page numbers on which the practice pointers are found. 
One example of a practice pointer states:
Practice pointer: For example, a general practitioner in rural Montana would have no 
reason to engage in extensive due diligence or know your client measures . . . if a long 
term client called the lawyer and asked her to form a limited liability company for the 
purpose of buying a ranch. However, if that same lawyer received a call from a new and 
unknown client saying that the client had just won several million dollars at poker in 
Nevada and needed the lawyer to form a limited liability company to buy a ranch, then 
a risk based approach would suggest that in this latter case, more extensive due diligence 
and know your client measures would be appropriate.
 Good Practices Guidance, supra note 84, at 8.
88. Compare FATF RBA, supra note 19, at ¶ 106 (identifying geography, service, and client risks), with 
Good Practices Guidance, supra note 84, at 15 (“The Lawyer Guidance identifies three major risk 
categories with regard to legal engagements: (a) country/geographic risk, (b) service risk, and (c) client 
risk.”).
89. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 84, at 27–33.
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 As is true with the conflicts of interest analysis that a lawyer performs at the outset 
of a client matter, the level and nature of the lawyer’s gatekeeper inquiry varies with the 
circumstances. For example, the Guidance indicates that the standard due diligence a 
lawyer performs may sometimes need to be adjusted upwards depending on the number 
and nature of the risk factors.90 Where enhanced due diligence is appropriate, the 
Guidance identifies additional steps that lawyers could find useful.91 Thus, a lawyer 
may want to ensure that for certain types of high-risk clients there is peer or managerial 
oversight regarding a lawyer’s decision to accept a client.92
 In addition to noting the circumstances in which enhanced due diligence would 
be appropriate, the Guidance also sets forth circumstances in which a reduced level of 
due diligence might be appropriate.93 For example, reduced levels of due diligence may 
be appropriate for publicly listed companies or clients, such as banks, that already are 
subject to extensive anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing rules.94 
This section of the Guidance also presents thirteen variables that may change the 
analysis, including the length of time the lawyer has known the client.95 These due 
diligence efforts are designed to help lawyers make a thorough and informed decision 
about whether it is appropriate to proceed with (or continue) representing a client. If a 
lawyer concludes that a client wants to use the lawyer to facilitate money laundering 
or terrorist financing, that lawyer should decline (or terminate) the representation.96
90. Id. at 28–32. The Guidance provides a list of ten factors that may lead one to conclude that there is a 
heightened level of risk associated with the client. Id. at 17–21. The Guidance also identified fourteen 
types of “service” that could lead a lawyer to conclude that there is a heightened level of risk. Id. at 21–28. 
With respect to geographic risk, the Guidance recommends that lawyers consult credible sources, which 
include “information that is produced by well-known bodies that generally are regarded as reputable and 
that make such information publicly and widely available. Examples of credible sources include the FATF, 
the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, FinCEN, OFAC, and the U.S. Department of 
State.” Id. at 16. See also discussion supra note 50 regarding the SDN list produced by OFAC. The 2008 
FATF RBA, like the Guidance, noted that the level of due diligence may need to be adjusted upwards 
depending on client, service, or geographic risks. See, e.g., FATF RBA, supra note 19, at ¶¶ 111–13.
91. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 84, at 32–34.
92. Id. at 33. 
93. Id. at 28–32.
94. Id. at 36.
95. Id. at 28–32. This section of the Guidance identified the following variable that might affect a lawyer’s 
analysis of the risk involved: (1) the nature of the client relationship; (2) existing regulation; (3) 
reputation and publicly available information; (4) regularity/duration of relationship; (5) familiarity with 
country/laws; (6) duration/magnitude of attorney-client relationship; (7) local counsel; (8) geographic 
disparity; (9) one-shot transactions; (10) technological developments favoring anonymity; (11) client 
origination/referral source; (12) structure of client/transaction; (13) trusts that are pension funds. Id.
96. Id. at 34, 37 (“The fundamental starting point for implementing a risk-based approach is for the lawyer 
to make an overall risk assessment of the client. Most lawyers perform elements of that assessment as 
part of their established client intake and conf licts review system.  .  .  . Not every risk-based approach 
analysis of a potential client will inexorably lead to the conclusion that, with appropriate controls, the lawyer can 
accept and proceed with the proposed engagement. It may be possible that the lawyer’s analysis will lead the 
lawyer to reject the engagement or to withdraw from the representation.”) (emphasis added).
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 The U.S. legal profession worked closely with the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury when developing the Guidance. Although Treasury had not previously 
endorsed a private-industry group-policy statement, it supported the Guidance and 
Treasury’s statement of support was included in the materials distributed to the ABA 
House of Delegates prior to its approval of the Guidance.97 In 2014, the Conference 
of Chief Justices endorsed the Guidance.98
 The Guidance has been prominently featured at a number of CLE sessions,99 but 
the efforts to publicize the Guidance have gone even further. For example, the ABA 
Gatekeeper Task Force prepared a Frequently Asked Questions document to make the 
Guidance more accessible.100 The ABA has asked bar associations to place the Guidance 
on their web sites,101 and the Task Force has persuaded the ABA Journal to publish 
several stories that reference it.102 Task Force members have encouraged professional 
responsibility academics to teach this material to law students and to include this 
material in ethics casebooks.103 Members have promised to provide hypothetical 
problems (with a suggested Teacher’s Guide) that academics may use to introduce their 
students to the Guidance.104 They also convinced the ABA to publish a book on 
gatekeeper issues; this book should become available in 2015 and will include 
97. See ABA Resolution 116, supra note 61, app. at 3 (“STATEMENT FROM UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY[:] The Treasury Department welcomes this Good Practices paper 
as a useful step in protecting the legal profession as well as the broader financial system from the risks 
of money laundering and terrorist financing. Treasury looks forward to continuing engagement with the 
ABA to facilitate implementation of effective policies and procedures to protect against money 
laundering and terrorist financing.”).
98. See Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 7: In Support of the Voluntary Good 
Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing (2014), available at http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/ccj/resolutions/07232014-
support-of-voluntary-good-practices-for-lawyers.ashx.
99. See supra notes 75–78 for a list of some of these CLE sessions. There is also a useful list in the ABA 
Response to FATF, supra note 50, at 21–32.
100. Am. Bar Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions About the Gatekeeper Initiative and the 
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/criminaljustice/gatekeeper_faq.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
101. See, e.g., Letter from Laurel G. Bellows, Am. Bar Ass’n President, to State and Local Bars (July 31, 
2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013jul31_
abaformalopinion463_l.authcheckdam.pdf (urging states to educate their members in various ways, 
including through their web page and by providing resources); Letter from Stephen N. Zack, Am. Bar 
Ass’n President, to State and Local Bars (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011apr08_goodpractices_o.authcheckdam.pdf (encouraging 
states to distribute and post the ABA Guidance on their web pages).
102. See Lindenberger, supra note 83; Hudson, supra note 83.
103. The author has personal knowledge that Kevin Shepherd, chair of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper 
Regulation and the Profession, has met with successive chairs of the AALS’s Section on Professional 
Responsibility. In addition, a representative from Treasury was encouraged to (and did) attend the 37th 
National Conference on Professional Responsibility, which was held in 2011 in Memphis, Tennessee 
under the auspices of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility. See supra note 80. 
104. The author has participated in conversations on this topic.
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information on the Guidance.105 In short, the Guidance has proved to be a lynchpin in 
the efforts to educate U.S. lawyers on money laundering and terrorist financing.
 A formal ethics opinion issued by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility has also begun to play a leading role in educational 
efforts.106 Members of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the 
Profession requested an opinion from the Standing Committee to assist them in 
their efforts to educate U.S. lawyers.107 These efforts came to fruition in 2013 when 
the Standing Committee issued ABA Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, 
Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing.108 This opinion confirms that lawyers 
using the risk-based control measures detailed in the Guidance are acting in a manner 
consistent with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.109
 A third document that is expected to play a central role in educating U.S. lawyers 
is the Lawyer’s Guide Report issued by the ABA, the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe (CCBE), and the International Bar Association (IBA),110 which 
was released in October 2014 during the IBA Annual Meeting in Tokyo.111
 The history of the Lawyer’s Guide is interesting. In 2013, the FATF published a 
Typologies Report for the legal profession,112 along with reports for other sectors,113 
which “identifies a number of [money laundering and terrorist financing] methods that 
commonly employ or, in some countries, require the services of a legal professional.”114 
Prior to issuing this report, legal profession representatives advised the FATF that the 
105. See Kevin L. Shepherd, The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client 
Due Diligence (forthcoming 2015).
106. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 78 (discussing client due diligence, money laundering, and terrorist 
financing).
107. The author has personal knowledge of these facts. See also Dennis Rendleman, Counsel to the ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Remarks at the 40th National Conference on Professional 
Responsibility (May 30, 2014).
108. See Formal Opinion 463, supra note 78.
109. Id.
110. See Int’l Bar Ass’n, Am. Bar Ass’n, & Council of Bars & Law Soc’ys of Eur., A Lawyer’s Guide 
to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter Lawyer’s Guide], 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_
preventingmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf.
111. See What’s New in Washington, Am. B. Ass’n, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_
legislative_work/new.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (follow “Read more…” hyperlink under “October 
2014: ABA, IBA, and CCBE Release Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering”).
112. See Typologies Report, supra note 57.
113. See, e.g., Fin. Action Task Force, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Through Trade 
in Diamonds (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML-TF-
through-trade-in-diamonds.pdf; Fin. Action Task Force, The Role of Hawala and Other Similar 
Service Providers in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Oct. 2013), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Role-of-hawala-and-similar-in-ml-tf.pdf.
114. See, e.g., Fin. Action Task Force, Methods and Trends: Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 4 (June 2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20vulnerabilities%20legal%20professionals.pdf.
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report would be most useful if it focused on unwitting involvement by lawyers, rather 
than intentional criminal activity.115 Despite the legal profession’s requests, the FATF 
report relied on case studies from its member countries, most of which involved 
criminal conduct by lawyers.116 Thus, despite requests to do so, the FATF report 
provides little guidance to lawyers on how to avoid unwitting involvement in money 
laundering or terrorist financing. The Lawyer’s Guide was drafted in order to provide 
such guidance.
 In sum, the Guidance, ABA Formal Opinion 463, and the Lawyer’s Guide, 
along with the Recommendations, are the anchor documents around which U.S. 
educational efforts are built. These documents have been, and will continue to be, 
the focus of CLE sessions, articles, and web sites that have been directed towards 
U.S. lawyers. U.S. legal profession organizations hope to educate lawyers so that it is 
as natural for lawyers to consider money laundering and terrorist financing issues as 
it is for them to consider conflict of interest issues. Similar to conflicts of interest, 
this type of inquiry would be appropriate both at the outset and throughout the 
course of the entire attorney-client relationship as new facts emerge or circumstances 
change. While this type of educational approach is unlikely to persuade lawyers who 
are undeterred by the criminal law system and intentionally engage in illegal 
activities, the hope is that internalized education will reduce unwitting involvement 
by lawyers in money laundering or terrorist financing.
115. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Bar Ass’n, to Fin. Action Task Force regarding Draft Typologies Report on 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals (May 6, 2013), available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013may8_gatekeeperregfatf_l.
authcheckdam.pdf.
We are pleased that [the] FATF formed a working group to examine typologies involving 
legal professionals. We feel this was a productive step to address the long-standing 
concern we have repeatedly expressed regarding the absence of helpful typologies 
involving legal professionals, especially those typologies highlighting unwitting 
involvement of legal professionals in money laundering or terrorist financing activities. . . . 
One of the concerns we have expressed, most recently during our conference call in 
February with the co-chair of the typologies working group, is that it is critically 
important that the typologies be practical, meaningful, and helpful in assisting legal 
professionals to detect money laundering and terrorist financing in their client intake 
processes and, later, in their representation of clients on an on-going basis. Measured 
from that standard, we feel that portion of the Typologies Draft dealing with the 
typologies falls short in the following ways. a. First, some of the typologies contain dense 
factual patterns that invariably involve complicit criminal activity by the legal professional.
 Id. at 1–2; accord Letter from the Council of Bars & Law Soc’ys of Eur., to Fin. Action Task Force 
regarding the Draft Typologies Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities 
of Legal Professionals (June 4, 2013), http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/
Final_Letter_to_FATF1_1370434174.pdf (“We note that the draft report unfortunately does not meet 
its initial objective of identifying potential money laundering/terrorist financing ‘vulnerabilities’ of the 
legal profession. This implied the elaboration of typologies illustrating situations where there are risks 
for lawyers to unwittingly participate in money laundering activities even when lawyers have completed 
their due diligence requirements.”).
116. See, e.g., Typologies Report, supra note 57, at 96–107.
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 C. While Progress Has Been Made, Work Remains to Be Done
 Although significant educational steps have been undertaken, more work needs 
to be done to minimize the chance that U.S. lawyers will be used to facilitate money 
laundering or terrorist financing. During the symposium, Professor Shima Baradaran 
spoke of an article she co-authored entitled “Funding Terror” that contains the 
results of an empirical study.117 For this study, the authors sent several versions of an 
email to firms around the world asking them if they would create a shell corporation 
and maintain anonymity.118 Some of the emails included references to countries 
recognized as sites of terrorism or to charitable organizations that might serve as 
fronts for terrorist financing.119
 While the article should be reviewed in its entirety, the results of this study were 
both encouraging and discouraging. On the positive side, U.S. law firms scored 
relatively high, meaning that not many responded to the fake email requests to set up 
a shell corporation.120 Although U.S. law firms responded “inappropriately”121 at a 
higher rate than corporation service providers in a number of tax-haven countries,122 
they were less likely to respond to these emails than providers in a number of other 
countries, including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.123 The discouraging 
aspect of this study was the fact that some U.S. lawyers responded to these emails.124
 As Baradaran’s article and my own experience125 reveal, additional work needs to 
be done to ensure that as many U.S. lawyers as possible consider issues of money 
laundering and terrorist financing when deciding whether—and how—to represent a 
117. See Baradaran et al., supra note 41; see also New York Law School FATF Symposium, supra note 1.
118. Baradaran et al., supra note 41, at 509–13, 531–33.
119. Id. at 512.
120. The article stated that 84.1 percent of U.S. law firms declined to respond to the emails. Id. at 516 n.195. 
Failing to respond is consistent with the risk-based approach that U.S. legal profession organizations 
have endorsed.
121. It is worth noting, however, that because of the methodology the authors used, a U.S. law firm could be 
rated partially compliant or even noncompliant for omitting actions that are not legally required of U.S. 
lawyers (for example, failing to obtain notarized copies of government-issued identity documentation or 
any photo identification). Id. at 513, 516.
122. The article offers a convincing explanation that tax haven countries may have a high rate of compliance 
because they are subject to regular government scrutiny and “[t]hese governments understand the 
importance of business clients and want to maintain a respectable reputation internationally for 
incorporation and banking.” See id. at 528–29.
123. Id. at 521 fig.3. Before becoming too complacent with the U.S. law firms’ relatively strong performance, 
it must be noted that the United States was the only country for which the authors disaggregated the 
data regarding law firms and other corporation service providers. Accordingly, while we know that U.S. 
law firms were less likely to respond positively to the fake emails than corporation service providers 
from many other countries, we do not know how well U.S. law firms performed compared to law firms 
in other countries. See id.
124. See id.
125. When I speak at CLE sessions to U.S. lawyers, I often ask for a show of hands of those who are familiar 
with the Recommendations and the Guidance. While the numbers are growing, the responses have 
convinced me that there is a need for ongoing education.
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client. But it is also clear that progress has been made in the efforts to educate U.S. 
lawyers about these issues, which can play an important role in the global efforts to 
reduce money laundering and terrorist financing. The next section suggests steps 
that might be undertaken, in addition to continuing the previously described 
educational efforts.
 D. Additional Educational Steps That May Be Useful 
 Although I have been active in efforts to educate U.S. lawyers about FATF 
issues,126 my preparation for the symposium led me to ask myself whether there was 
anything additional that either I, or the U.S. legal profession, might undertake in 
order to promote better awareness of these issues. I concluded that the answer to 
both of those questions was “Yes.”
 On a personal level, I decided that there was more that I could be doing in the 
classroom. This year, for the first time, my legal ethics casebook contained material 
about the FATF.127 I discussed with my students the FATF information, showed the 
ABA Gatekeeper web page, and discussed issues related to the Guidance. I could do 
more, however. As a result of comments at the symposium by Professor Jack Sahl, 
next year I plan to distribute the two-page Client Intake Form found in the Appendix 
to the Guidance.128 In addition, I plan to distribute a summary of the Guidance that 
directs students to its Practice Pointers so that they can more easily synthesize the 
information found in the forty-page document (the Appendix to this article is the 
summary that I plan to distribute). Finally, I plan to distribute the recommendations 
that ACTEC attaches to the Guidance.129 Although the ACTEC recommendations 
are designed for a trusts and estate practice, they provide a useful starting point to 
help students visualize how both large firms and small firms might implement the 
concepts embodied in the Guidance.130
126. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 8. This article was part of a FATF program I helped organize for the AALS’s 
2010 Annual Meeting, when I was chair of the AALS Section of Professional Responsibility. The 
presentation slides from that program, along with my presentation slides from the 2012 Midyear 
Meeting of the National Organization of Bar Counsel, are cited on my “Presentations” web page under 
the heading “Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Lawyer Regulation.” See Laurel S. Terry, Selected 
Presentations, Penn St., http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/presentations.htm (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2015). For the last two years, I have served as a member of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper 
Regulation and the Profession.
127. Russell G. Pearce, Daniel J. Capra, Bruce A. Green, Renee Knake & Laurel Terry, 
Professional Responsibility: A Contemporary Approach 404 (West 2d ed. 2013) (containing a 
“Global Perspectives” note that focuses on the FATF and the Guidance).
128. See Good Practices Guidance, supra note 84, at 38–39.
129. See Recommendations of Good Practices for ACTEC Fellows Seeking to Detect and Combat Money Laundering, 
Am. C. Trust & Est. Counsel (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.actec.org/public/Governmental_Relations/
FATFBestPractices.asp.
130. Id. One can also look outside the United States for assistance. For example, the Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada has adopted model rules related to Know Your Client (KYC) and accepting cash 
from clients. See Model Rules to Fight Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Fed’n L. Soc’ys 
Canada, available at http://www.f lsc.ca/en/model-rules-to-fight-money-laundering-and-terrorist-
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 I also took the opportunity while writing this article to consider actions the ABA 
Gatekeeper Task Force might take to increase the effectiveness of its outreach. I 
concluded that it might be useful to post on its web site a summary of the Guidance 
(similar to that found in the Appendix to this article) and links to the outreach 
efforts by state bars.131 Having these links centralized on a web page could encourage 
those jurisdictions that currently do not have links to add them, and could also make 
it easier for lawyers to locate the web pages, CLE sessions, and webinars that are 
most relevant to their practice. Another step I recommend is posting on the ABA 
Gatekeeper web page a set of clearly labeled “CLE” materials that state bars and 
others could use when creating an education program. This package could include 
not only the Guidance and the FAQ , but newly generated documents such as the 
summary referred to above, sample intake forms, hypotheticals, and perhaps some 
law review and ABA Journal articles.
 Finally, I recommend that the ABA Task Force prepare a short summary of the 
U.S. government document entitled “Money Laundering Threat Assessment” to use 
in connection with CLE sessions and to post on its web page.132 This document 
would help lawyers understand the seriousness of these issues and why it is important 
for lawyers to avoid unwittingly assisting money launderers or those involved in 
terrorist financing. U.S. lawyers need to recognize the important role they can play 
in facilitating—or inhibiting—these types of criminals.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 Most U.S. lawyers are not criminals and will not intentionally participate in 
money laundering or terrorist financing schemes. For those lawyers who are willing 
to engage in such intentional wrongdoing, however, the United States has an 
elaborate system of criminal laws and disciplinary sanctions.
 Because intentional conduct is addressed by both criminal law and lawyer 
discipline, the U.S. legal profession’s response to the Recommendations has focused 
on educational efforts to help U.S. lawyers avoid unwittingly assisting a client who is 
financing/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). These rules have been implemented throughout Canada. A 
number of provinces provide forms for lawyers to use as part of the client identification and verification 
process. See, e.g., Law Soc’y of Upper Can., Bylaw 7.1, Part III: Client Identification and 
Verification 7, available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147485777 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015); N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, Regulations Made Pursuant to the Legal 
Profession Act § 4.5 (2014), available at http://cdn2.nsbs.org/sites/default/files/cms/menu-pdf/
currentregs.pdf. Although the Canadian KYC rules have been criticized by a leading Canadian 
commentator for not utilizing the risk-based approach, see sources cited supra note 66, the Canadian 
forms can provide helpful, concrete questions for lawyers who are unsure where to begin with a risk-
based approach and for whom the trusts-and-estates-based sample intake form is inapplicable.
131. See supra note 72 (highlighting some of these web pages).
132. For information about the most recent Threat Assessment, see 2007 National Money Laundering 
Strategy, supra note 44, at app. A. The web page of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation 
and the Profession is a useful one-stop location for relevant information. See Task Force on Gatekeeper 
Regulation and the Profession, Am. B. Ass’n, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/
gatekeeper.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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engaged in money laundering or terrorist activities. Over the years, U.S. legal 
organizations have developed a series of policy documents that are more detailed and 
profession-specific than the Recommendations. These documents include the 
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, referred to in this article as the Guidance; the 
ABA FAQ document regarding the Guidance; ABA Formal Opinion 463; and the 
2014 Lawyer’s Guide prepared by the ABA, CCBE, and IBA.
 These documents provide the backbone for the educational efforts directed 
towards U.S. lawyers and regulators. The goal is to encourage U.S. lawyers to use a 
risk-based approach in which they thoughtfully consider client, service, and 
geographic risks when deciding whether to represent a client. While there is still 
work to be done with respect to educating U.S. lawyers about how to avoid unwitting 
involvement in money laundering or terrorist financing, it is clear that progress is 
being made. U.S. lawyers and legal organizations should continue their efforts so, at 
the client intake stage, it becomes as natural for lawyers to consider money laundering 
and terrorist financing issues as it is for them to consider conflict of interest issues.
 In my view, the U.S. government and the U.S. legal profession are to be 
commended for taking the “long view” in their approach to implementing the 
Recommendations. Done well, a risk-based approach can engage lawyers’ hearts and 
minds and draw upon their commitment to avoid assisting money launderers or 
terrorists. I believe that few lawyers would knowingly and willingly provide such 
assistance. For this reason, an educational approach can be much more effective in 
stopping terrorism and money laundering than a rules-based approach that may lead 
to lawyers (or their staff) mindlessly checking boxes without thinking of the 
consequences. Lawyers must learn how sophisticated clients might attempt to use 
their services and take steps to avoid unwittingly assisting such clients. Such a result 
would be helpful to the United States and to the world at large.
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appEndiX
Laurel Terry’s Summary & Supplement to the
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance (VGPG)1
(Prepared by Laurel Terry, LTerry@psu.edu)
 ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) provides that a “lawyer shall not counsel a client to 
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” 
ABA Model Rule 1.16(a) requires that a lawyer withdraw from representation if “the 
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.” 
Under Rule 8.4, a lawyer is subject to discipline if the lawyer violates or attempts to 
violate a rule of professional conduct, commits a criminal act that reflects adversely on 
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; or engages 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, or that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice. Most state ethics rules are substantially similar to these 
Model Rules. Because U.S. lawyers are subject to stringent conflict of interest rules 
(Rules 1.7–1.9), client identification is a necessary part of lawyers’ practices.
 In 2008, the FATF adopted a risk based guidance document entitled “RBA 
Guidance for Legal Professionals.” This document is “high-level” guidance intended 
to provide a broad framework for implementing a risk-based approach for the legal 
profession. It urged the legal profession and individual countries to develop and 
implement “an effective risk-based approach.” (FATF RBA Guidance at ¶¶ 6–7). In 
2010, a significant number of U.S. legal profession organizations endorsed the 
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (VGPG) (The ABA House of Delegates 
endorsed the VGPG document in August 2010). The VGPG summarizes the FATF 
RBA Guidance but provides more detailed guidance to U.S. lawyers by including 
Practice Pointers and Appendix A (p. 38) regarding client intake. ABA Formal 
Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing 
(May 23, 2013) confirms that lawyers who use the risk-based control measures 
detailed in the VGPG to avoid aiding illegal activities are acting in a manner 
consistent with the Model Rules. This Summary is not intended to replace the 
VGPG but to provide a shorter, more visual summary and to help U.S. lawyers more 
quickly locate the relevant section of the VGPG, including its Practice Pointers.
•	 	In	addition	to	the	VGPG,	lawyers	may	find	it	useful	to	consult	
the October 2014 Lawyers’ Guide jointly prepared by the 
International Bar Association, the CCBE, and the ABA.2
1. Am. Bar Ass’n, Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/voluntary_good_practices_guidance.authcheckdam.pdf.
2. Am. Bar Ass’n, A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering (2014), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_
preventingmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Are any of the following present? (See VGPG Practice Pointers (PP) found on pp. 12–14)
1. Buying or selling of Real Estate?
2. Managing client money, securities, or other assets?
3. Management of bank, savings, or securities account?
4.  Organization of contributions for the creation, operation, or management of companies?
5.  Creation, operation/management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and 
selling of business entities?
v If the answer to any of these questions is “YES,” perform Client Due Diligence (CDD).
In determining the appropriate level of CDD,  
consider the three major risk categories:
1. Country/Geographic Risk (See PP on p. 16)
2.  Client Risk (See PP on pp. 17–21)
  The FATF RBA Guidance identifies ten categories of potentially higher risk clients: 
(1) politically exposed persons (PEPS); (2) unusual activity; (3) masking beneficial 
ownership; (4) cash intensive business (unless subject to AML/CFT regulation); (5) 
charities and NPOs not subject to monitoring or supervision; (6) f inancial 
intermediaries not subject to adequate AML/CFT rules; (7) clients with criminal 
convictions; (8) clients with no address/multiple addresses; (9) unexplained change in 
instructions; and (10) structures with no legal purpose.
3.  Service Risk (See PP on pp. 21–28)
  The FATF RBA Guidance identifies fourteen types of services that are at higher risk 
for money laundering and terrorist financing. These typically involve the movement of 
funds and/or the concealment of beneficial ownership: (1) touching the money test; (2) 
concealment of beneficial ownership; (3) performing services outside area of expertise; 
(4) accelerated real estate transfers; (5) cash payments and payments from other sources; 
(6) inadequate consideration; (7) estate administration where the decedent had been 
convicted of proceeds generating crimes; (8) extraordinary legal fees; (9) source of 
funds/wealth; (10) out of character transactions; (11) shell companies; (12) hard-to-
identify trust beneficiaries; (13) anonymity; and (14) trust services.
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Controls for Higher Risk Clients: The FATF RBA Guidance does not prohibit a lawyer from 
representing a higher-risk client, but it directs the lawyer to implement appropriate measures 
and controls to mitigate the potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks of 
those higher-risk clients.
v  These measures and controls may include the following: (1) general training; (2) specific 
training; (3) enhanced due diligence; (4) peer/managerial oversight; (5) evolving 
evaluation of services; (6) ongoing/evolving evaluation of clients; and (7) overlap.
These measures, together with a Practice Pointer, are set forth in greater detail on pp. 32–34.
Variables That May Affect Risk: In determining the appropriate level of CDD, the FATF RBA 
Guidance identifies a number of variables that may require enhanced due diligence or that may 
lead the lawyer to conclude that standard CDD can be reduced:
v  These variables include: (1) the nature of the client relationship; (2) existing regulation; 
(3) reputation and publicly available information; (4) regularity/duration of relationship; 
(5) familiarity with country/laws; (6) duration/magnitude of attorney-client relationship; 
(7) local counsel; (8) geographic disparity; (9) one-shot transactions; (10) technological 
developments favoring anonymity; (11) client origination/referral source; (12) structure 
of client/transaction; and (13) trusts that are pension funds.
Each of these risk variables is discussed in greater detail in the VGPG Practice Pointers on 
pp. 28–32.
Basic Protocol for Client Intake and Assessment (VGPG pp. 34–39),  
including its Appendix A:
Standard Level of Client Due Diligence
Individual Clients Organizational Clients(including trusts & estates)
1.  Identify the client and  verify that client’s 
identity using reliable independent 
source documents, data, or information. 
Document the findings. See VGPG on 
p. 35
See VGPG on p. 35 at 6.1 for examples of 
information and documents the lawyer may 
use. See Appendix A at 1.1, p. 38 for additional 
identity information a lawyer should seek 
depending on the circumstances. See 2.1 for 
potential verification steps, depending on the 
risk profile of the client, including an OFAC 
scan, other searches, and background checks. 
See VGPG Appendix A, #2 on p. 39; see also 
url cited on the following page.
2  Obtain information on the purpose and 
intended nature of the business relationship. 
See p. 35.
1.  Identify the client and  verify the client’s 
identity using reliable independent 
source documents, data, or information. 
Document the findings. See VGPG on 
p. 35.
See VGPG on p. 35 at 6.1 and 6.2 for examples 
of information and documents the lawyer may 
use. See Appendix A at 1.2, p. 38 for additional 
identity information a lawyer should seek 
depending on the circumstances. See Appendix 
A at 2.1 on p. 39 for potential verification steps, 
depending on the risk profile of the client, 
including an OFAC scan, other searches, and 
background checks.
2.  Obtain information on the purpose and 
intended nature of the business relationship. 
See VGPG p. 35.
Are any of the following present? (See VGPG Practice Pointers (PP) found on pp. 12–14)
1. Buying or selling of Real Estate?
2. Managing client money, securities, or other assets?
3. Management of bank, savings, or securities account?
4.  Organization of contributions for the creation, operation, or management of companies?
5.  Creation, operation/management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and 
selling of business entities?
v If the answer to any of these questions is “YES,” perform Client Due Diligence (CDD).
In determining the appropriate level of CDD,  
consider the three major risk categories:
1. Country/Geographic Risk (See PP on p. 16)
2.  Client Risk (See PP on pp. 17–21)
  The FATF RBA Guidance identifies ten categories of potentially higher risk clients: 
(1) politically exposed persons (PEPS); (2) unusual activity; (3) masking beneficial 
ownership; (4) cash intensive business (unless subject to AML/CFT regulation); (5) 
charities and NPOs not subject to monitoring or supervision; (6) f inancial 
intermediaries not subject to adequate AML/CFT rules; (7) clients with criminal 
convictions; (8) clients with no address/multiple addresses; (9) unexplained change in 
instructions; and (10) structures with no legal purpose.
3.  Service Risk (See PP on pp. 21–28)
  The FATF RBA Guidance identifies fourteen types of services that are at higher risk 
for money laundering and terrorist financing. These typically involve the movement of 
funds and/or the concealment of beneficial ownership: (1) touching the money test; (2) 
concealment of beneficial ownership; (3) performing services outside area of expertise; 
(4) accelerated real estate transfers; (5) cash payments and payments from other sources; 
(6) inadequate consideration; (7) estate administration where the decedent had been 
convicted of proceeds generating crimes; (8) extraordinary legal fees; (9) source of 
funds/wealth; (10) out of character transactions; (11) shell companies; (12) hard-to-
identify trust beneficiaries; (13) anonymity; and (14) trust services.
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Enhanced Level of Client Due Diligence Reduced Level of Client Due Diligence
•	 Clients that are reasonably determined 
by the lawyer to be of higher risk require 
enhanced CDD.
•	 Enhanced client due diligence means a 
more in-depth, systematic inquiry into 
the client and its ownership and business 
activities.
•	 The lawyer needs to ensure that the 
client and its ownership and business 
activities comply with applicable law 
and that no criminal activity is involved. 
See VGPG PP at p. 36. 
Lawyers can use reduced CDD with:
1. Publicly listed companies.
2.  Financial institutions subject to AML/
CFT regulation.
3.  Government authorities and state-run 
enterprises. See VGPG p. 36.
See also the prior risk-based analysis on pp. 
488–489.
CRITICAL NOTE: “Not every risk-based approach analysis of a potential client will 
inexorably lead to the conclusion that, with appropriate controls, the lawyer can accept 
and proceed with the proposed engagement. It may be possible that the lawyer’s analysis 
will lead the lawyer to reject the engagement or to withdraw from the representation.” See 
VGPG p. 37; see also your state’s equivalent of ABA Model Rules 1.2(d), 1.16, and 8.4. 
Periodic review may be appropriate depending on the risk factors. The VGPG and 
ACTEC Sample Intake forms are very helpful. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, Appendix 
A: Basic Client Intake, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategor ized /GAO/voluntar ygoodpract icesguidance_ Appendix%20A.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Am. Coll. of Trust & Estate 
Counsel, FATF and the Good Practices Guidance (Mar. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/ACTEC%20
Appendix%20C.authcheckdam.pdf.
